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book seem to me to spring from the same single source. The author has
all his life been in love with the notion of purpose and this passion, like
any other, can both inspire and blind a man. I have tried to show how
it has done both to the author. The inspiration is so considerable that
I would not wish him to terminate his longstanding union with this
ide maitresse. But I wish that the high romance would settle down to
some cooler form of regard. When this happens, the author's many
readers will feel the drop in temperature; but they will be amply com-
pensated by an increase in light.
H. L. A. HART*
FEDERAL COURTS. By Charles Alan Wright.' St. Paul: West Publishing
Co. 1963. Pp. xvi, 496, 138 (appendix). $xo.oo.
This excellent little book covers a great deal of important ground in
procedure and does so in a thoughtful and probing way. The first half
of the book is concerned with problems of federal jurisdiction which the
author seeks to consider, in acknowledged response to the scholarship
of Professors Hart and Wechsler, "in terms of their effect on our system
of federalism, rather than as purely technical exercises . . ." (p. ix).2
Most of the second half treats the procedure in the federal district
courts.3 The book ends with three rather short chapters (11, 12 & 13)
on the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court, and the original jurisdiction of the latter.
The plan of this book may sacrifice something of unity; it certainly
calls for a shift of emphasis at midpoint. The peculiar problems of
judicial administration injected by the federal nature of our system are
not the same as those perennial problems which any procedural system
(with a heritage of adversary proceeding and jury trial) must face. Nor
do they involve altogether the same aims and values - at least the
emphasis is quite different. The problems of federalism concern pri-
marily the adjustment of competing claims of state and nation under
our order of dual sovereignty; the perennial problems of procedure
concern the claims of individuals to have their cases decided on the
merits, and the adjustment between such claims and those of adminis-
trative efficiency and procedural fairness to the adversary. Problems of
the latter type would exist under a unitary form of government - they
do not spring from federalism. Perhaps this difference in the nature of
the problems justifies treating federal jurisdiction in a separate law
school course and concentrating on the perennial problems in the basic
* Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University.
1 Professor of Law, University of Texas; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard
University.
2 The nine chapter headings in the first half of the book are: "The Federal
Judicial System," "The judicial Power of the United States," "Federal Question,"
"Diversity of Citizenship," "Jurisdictional Amount," "Removal Jurisdiction and
Procedure," "Venue," "The Relations of State and Federal Courts," and "The Law
Applied by the Federal Courts."
' Chapter io, entitled "Procedure in the District Courts," comprises about 40%
of the text. Chapter ii, "The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals,"
contains little that bears on the peculiar problems of federalism.
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procedure course, as is the prevailing mode (although the division of
subject matter among law school courses is not a very strong argument
in favor of anything).
There are, however, connections between the first and second halves
of Professor Wright's book that justify his plan. In dealing with the
allocation of judicial business between two sets of courts it is surely
relevant to know what kind of justice each of these sets dispenses. Be-
yond this, there is a close interrelation between many of the specific
perennial problems and certain aspects of the federal nature of our
government, and this book points up well some of these relationships.
The limitations on state court jurisdiction, for instance, often frustrate
state court attempts to do the kind of justice among individuals that
the device of interpleader is designed to afford. The federal judicial
system is uniquely able to do this kind of justice even when no federal
questions are concerned (§ 74) There is also interplay between the
problems of federalism and basic procedural problems in other fields of
joinder of claims and parties (§§ 7I-8o), in the determination of who
are indispensable parties (§ 70), and so on. Professor Wright has dealt
well with these areas.
Many of the treatments of individual topics are of a very high order.
Professor Wright is abreast of recent developments and recent thought
by commentators and he has summarized and analyzed much of this
with a neat clarity that is not at all superficial. Some of the parts that
particularly appealed to me are his treatments of the arguments for
and against diversity jurisdiction (§ 23), the law applied in the federal
courts (Erie and all that) (§§ 54-6o), discovery (§§ 81-9o), and
pleading (§§ 66-69). The section on discovery is very detailed for a
book of this length, and deals admirably and quite specifically with the
burning current problems (including, of course, work product, special
necessity and good cause, and the disclosure of statements taken by
others than the lawyer conducting the case). The section on pleading
uses quite a different technique. It is scarcely detailed enough for the
' The success of interpleader depends on bringing all claimants into a single
action. But the decision in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518
(i9x6), requires a court (in most cases) to get personal jurisdiction over a
claimant before a binding adjudication of his claim may be had. When claimants
live in different states there may well be no state court that can get jurisdiction
over all of them since a state's process cannot run beyond its borders for this
purpose. Federal process, on the other hand, may constitutionally be made to run
to all parts of the country, and Congress has provided for this in the Federal
Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).
This solution of a general problem of procedure by resort to federal aspects of
our system raises its own peculiar problems. One of these is the constitutional
question of how far Congress may dilute the historic requirement of total diversity
(and thus maximize the availability of federal interpleader). Another problem is
more subtle. At present federal courts apply state conflict of laws rules in diversity
cases. But since in interpleader a federal court can get jurisdiction over persons
who could not be brought into the local state court, local conflict of laws rules and,
consequently, local idiosyncrasies of substantive law, may now sometimes bind
persons and apply to situations that could not possibly have been brought within
their ambit without the aid of federal long-arm process. Something like this
probably happened in Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (I94I). It is doubtful
indeed whether such byproducts of our federal system are happy or necessary ones.




purposes either of a pleader or a student engaged in the pleading part
of a basic procedure course; but it does depict the nature of the pleading
problem and of the modern attempts to solve it with bold, sure strokes.
And it contains the best analysis I have seen of the controversial -
and much maligned - Dioguardi case 5 (§ 68).
No book, I suppose, fails to disappoint a reviewer in some respect.
Here my disappointments were few. I found them in the sections on
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction (§ i6), and on the pretrial con-
ference (§ 91). The first may well come from differences of opinion.
In his criticism of the United Mine Workers 6 decision and his difficulty
in distinguishing it from other cases,7 it seems to me that Professor
Wright takes too little account of two things: (i) the notion that res
judicata will not be applied to jurisdictional rulings when to do so
would contravene a strong policy "against the court's acting beyond its
jurisdiction"; 8 (2) the far more imperative nature of a court's need to
maintain the status quo pending a determination that might be frustrated
by the status quo's disturbance, than of a court's need to see that docu-
ments are disclosed (under federal rule 34) before an appellate deter-
mination of the duty to make disclosure. The notion, it seems to me,
adequately justifies a distinction between United Mine Workers and In
re Green 9 (as indeed a majority of the Court itself thought).1° The
imperative need seems to me adequately to explain the difference be-
tween treating disobedience that threatens the status quo, and treating
disobedience that carries no such threat, and also to be far more sig-
nificant than the conceptual differences between "jurisdiction" and
((error" out of which Professor Wright constructs an a fortiori argument
the other way that ends up by puzzling its author."
My quarrel with the treatment of the pretrial conference stands on
quite a different footing. Professor Wright does not reveal that this is
one of the great new battlegrounds between the special and the general
pleaders, 12 a fact of which our common mentor, Judge Charles Clark,
was keenly aware.
'Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. I944).' United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
'In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962); Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry.,
297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964); Hauger v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 216 F.2d 5o (Tth Cir. 1954).
RTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10(2) (e) (X942). Professor Wright himself men-
tions this notion and quite properly, I think, explains the decision in Kalb v. Feuer-
stein, 3o8 U.S. 433 (X940), on the basis of it (p. 45).
9369 U.S. 689 (1962).
"0 Id. at 692 n.i. Professor Wright does not say expressly that this distinction
is a tenuous one, but I construe his text as intimating as much (pp. 46-47). If I
am mistaken in this, my apologies.
"a Professor Wright notes that the discovery cases "make no reference to the
United Mine Workers decision and thus it is not clear why a party is permitted
to take his chances on defying an order which he believes to be erroneous or an
abuse of discretion, and not be punished for it if the appellate court agrees with
his view, while he is not given the same privilege where he believes the court lacks
jurisdiction" (p. 46). It is submitted that the significant distinction is not between
error and jurisdiction in this context. If the court that erroneously ordered dis-
closure also, as an ancillary part of this erroneous order, forbade destruction of the
document pending appellate determination, would not the forbidden destruction
be punished no matter how the appellate determination went?
11 See Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 1961) ("Not with-
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I also wish that the chapter on appellate jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals (ch. ii) contained a little more of the kind of thoughtful
appraisal of the appellate process which Professor Wright himself has
given us in a valuable article.13
These criticisms surely are minor ones. I heartily recommend Pro-
fessor Wright's book to every student of federal procedure and federal
jurisdiction. It will also serve well the judge or practitioner when he
needs a critical summary treatment that pulls many things together,
rather than a detailed book of reference.
FLEMING JAMES, JR. *
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL
EcoNoMIcs AND RESPONSIBILITIES. By F. B. MacKinnon.' Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Co. 1964. Pp. 246. $6.oo.
This is a study, made under the auspices of the American Bar Founda-
tion, of the contingent fee system as it has developed in the United
States - its origins, characteristics, economic significance to the bar
and to the public, and its relation to the ethical standards of the pro-
fession. According to the author, the contingent fee has become the
dominant method in this country for financing legal services by persons
seeking to assert pecuniary claims. As such, it merits close scrutiny,
particularly in view of the fact that in other countries it is generally
condemned. While Mr. MacKinnon expressly disclaims any intent to
pass judgment on the system, he has undertaken to assemble a con-
siderable amount of historical and statistical material concerning it,
and to review most of the arguments that have been advanced as to
its social desirability.
Strictly speaking, a contingent fee agreement is one that calls for
payment of compensation for legal services only in the event of recovery
of some amount for the client. The compensation to be paid is usually
stated in terms of a percentage of the amount recovered; if nothing is
recovered, no fee is paid. If a reasonable minimum fee is to be paid,
win or lose, the agreement is not a contingent fee agreement even though
a specified percentage of the recovery is to be paid in the event of success.
Contingent fee agreements are now sanctioned (although not neces-
sarily in all types of cases) in every state except Maine. The latest
state to fall in line is Massachusetts. Nevertheless, such agreements are
still regarded with varying degrees of suspicion, not only by many lay-
men but also by some courts and members of the bar. Within the last
thirty years, the Boston Bar Association, in one of its official canons,
out careful planning were the federal rules designed to eliminate the evils of special
pleading, and they should not be brought back under the guise of pre-trial.") ; See
Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454 (1961).
" Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
75I (1957).
* Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation; member of the Massachusetts
Bar.
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